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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN R. JENNER and MARJORIE E.
JENNER, his wife,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.
REAL ESTATE SERVICES, a Utah

corporation, JOSEPH c. FRANICH
and CAROLYN M. FRANICH, his
wife; and LARRY J. NIELSON and
KAY NIELSON, his wife,

.
.
.
.
.

..
...

CASE NO. 18100

Defendants,
RONALD JOHNSON,

Intervenor/Appellant.

.

NATURE OF THE CASE

The respondents obtained a Default Judgment against
defendants cancelling a Uniform Real Estate Contract after entry
of which appellant sought to intervene in the action as a party
defendant and to set aside the default judgment.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court denied the motions to
intervene and to set aside the default
. judgment brought by
appellant.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to obtain the right to intervene, to
set aside the default judgment and to assert a defense to the
plaintiffs' complaint.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since no testimony was taken in the trial court except

with respect to attorney's fees in connection with the default
judgment, the parties to this appeal rely on the statement of
evidence (R. 65 ff) jointly agreed upon.

The record in the lower

court establishes the chronology of events.

After serving all

named defendants with a Notice to Quit pursuant to the Utah
unlawful detainer statute, Title 78-36-6, U.C.A., 1953, as
amended, plaintiffs proceeded by complaint for cancellation of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract, forfeiture to sellers of
payments theretofore made as liquidated damages for
nonperformance, for a Writ of Restitution and other relief.
In view of appellant's contention that he timely sought
to intervene in the action, it should be noted that the Notice to
Quit was served on appellant's co-venturer, Joseph
August 8, 1981 (see paragraph 4 of complaint).

c.

Franich, on

The complaint was

filed August 19, 1981, more than five (5) days after the service
of Notices to Quit on all known defendants.

The Court
shortened
.

the time for answer as provided in Title 78-35-8, U.C.A., 1953,
as amended, to five (5) days (R. 10) and a copy of the summons
and complaint was served on Joseph

c.

appellant, on September 11, 1981.

September 23, 1981, the

Franich, co-venturer of

default period of five (5) days having run as against all named
defendants, plaintiffs appeared through their counsel bef6re the
District Judge and upon demonstrating the default, producing the
documents evidencing the Uniform Real Estate Contract and its
assignment and giving evidence of a reasonable attorney's fee,
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the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment granting the relief prayed for in the complaint with the
exception of the amount sought as delinquent installment payments
and taxes.

The Court interpreted paragraph 16A of the Uniform

Real Estate Contract as an alternative remedy the election of
which constituted a waiver of both delinquent installments and
any obligation to pay taxes.
Thus, by the time default judgment was entered on
August 23, 1981 no payment had been made under the terms of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract since May 14, 1981 (see paragraph 3
of Complaint R.3), a period of over four months.

A

Writ of

Restitution immediately issued and was served upon appellant's
co-venturer, Joseph

c.

Franich, on September 24, 1981 (R. 22).

Appellant filed his Motion to Intervene October 6,
1981, accompanied by his Affidavit.

Exhibit "A" (R. 25, 26)

attached to the Motion to Intervene is an agreement entered into
the 27th of March, 1979 between appellant, Ronald Johnson, and
defendant, Joseph C. Franich. That agreement includes the
~allowing

provisions:
2.

It is understood that the purpose of the
agreement is for real estate investment
purposes.

3.

The intent is to be long term investments,
however, some shorter term investments may be
necessary at times depending on the character
of the property invested in.

* * *
5.

Franich will be responsible for all
management, collection of rents, and
maintenance.

-3-
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6.

Franich is to invest the monies in a prudent
manner but, provides no guarantees, except of
return of principle amount of $11,000.00 and
1/2 of profit.

7.

Franich is to receive 10% percent of all
rents collected as compensation for time, gas
and management.

8.

All monies received from properties will be
divided between Franich and Johnson on a 5050 basis after expenses.

* * *
12. Depreciation and expenses will be shared on a
50-50 basis for tax purposes.
The Uniform Real Estate Contract involved in this
action was executed October 31, 1978 between plaintiffs and
defendant Real Estate Services.

The assignment of that contract

to defendants Joseph C. Franich and Carolyn M. Franich and Larry
J. Nielson and Kay Nielson occurred October 30, 1979, three days
after the agreement of appellant and Franich referred to above
and is claimed to be one of the "long term investments"
contemplated by the Franich - Johnson agreement (see paragraphs 2
and 3 of appellant's affidavit, R. 27).

Appellant was never a

party to any contract or assignment, nor was the existence of a
silent partner indicated by the documents executed by Franich.
The appellant received a Quit Claim Deed from Joseph

c.

and Carolyn M. Franich September 15, 1981 (R. 28) and recorded it
the same date in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
The parties have agreed in the Statement of Evidence that
"intervenor's interest was not known to the plaintiffs nor any of
the other defendants in the lawsuit (with the obvious exception

-4-
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of Joseph C. Franich) and not of record until the 15th day of
September, 1981," (the "knowledge" of plaintiffs or other
defendants on that date being assumed from the fact of
recordation).

On September 25, 1981 intervenor determined

through a realtor friend, that "a foreclosure action had
commenced on one of the properties and that there were some
problems with the delinquency on the property included on the
above suit" (see paragraph 2, appellant's affidavit, R. 28).
Appellant contacted plaintiffs' attorney and for the first time
made known his alleged interest in the property on September 30,
1981 (see paragraph 7, appellant's affidavit, R. 28), six days
after the Writ of Restitution was served.
Thereafter, appellant tendered the delinquency on the
contract together with costs and attorney's fees to plaintiffs
but the tender was refused.
As shown by the Uniform Real Estate Contract (R. 6) the
properties were sold by plaintiffs to defendant Real Estate
Services for $86,600.00, $1,600.00 of which was paid by buyer
assuming a note due December 1, 1979 and the balance payable at
$760.49 per month commencing December 1, 1978.

The sum

forfeited, therefore, included the $1,600.00 note payment and
$760.49 paid each month until May 14, 1981.

Defendant Real

Estate Services or its assignee, Joseph C. Franich, had
possession of the property from November 1, 1978 through
September 24, 1981, a period of thirty-two (32) months and
twenty-three (23) days.

Assuming that payments were made for

each month through May, 1981 and commencing December 1, 1979
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there would have been twenty-nine (29) payments at $760.49 each
for a total of $22,054.21 paid on the contract (including
interest) and an additional $1,600.00 paid on the note referred
to as a down payment, for a total of $23,654.21 during nearly
thirty-three (33) month's occupancy.

Although the amount of the

forfeiture is not an issue at this time, it appears that the
buyers of the three (3) rental units paid a total of $716.79 per
month for that occupancy.
The motion of appellant to intervene in the action
following judgment and to set the default judgment aside was
heard by the District Court October 14, 1981 and following
argument the motion to intervene was denied.

It is believed that

the minute entry is incorrect in stating that "the Motion to
Intervene was considered moot since the Motion to set aside
Default Judgment was denied

11

(R. 51).

If the Court considered

one of the motions "moot" it would obviously be the Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment, since appellant would have no standing to
set aside the default judgment until he was permitted to
intervene.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PROPOSED INTERVENOR IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY THE SUBJECT OF THE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION AS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS.

Since the agreement between appellant and Joseph
Franich of March 27, 1979 was not a matter of public record nor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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did plaintiffs have any knowledge of such agreement until ·the
Motion to Intervene was filed by appellant in the District Court,
it is submitted that the proposed intervenor's "interest" was a
secret or dormant interest and remained so until at least the
15th day of September, 1981 when the Quit Claim Deed was placed
of record.

The agreement between appellant and Franich is, on

its face, an agreement of joint venture or partnership.
Appellant's conduct in permitting the ostensible partner or coventurer to enter into an assignment whereby he (together with
his wife and two other parties) acquired an interest in a Uniform
Real Estate Contract in their own names is such conduct as estops
appellant from asserting any interest in the property as against
plaintiffs.

At C.J.S., Partnership, Section 176, Undisclosed and

Dormant Partners, Notice and Demand, appears the following:
"Dormant partner is estopped from asserting his
real interest as against those who have in good
faith acted on the appearance of the acting
partner's sole ownership."
The C.J.S. annotation quotes In Re Flynn's Estate, 43 P.2d 8, 181
Wash. 284 (1935) in which the Court stated:
"Where one partner is permitted to assume sole
charge and superintendence of the property of an
undisclosed or dormant partnership and to deal
with it as his own, the property, though actually
belonging to the partnership is, so far as
innocent third persons are concerned, to be
regarded as the sole property of the active
partner, and the dormant partner is estopped from
asserting his real interest therein as against
those who have, in good faith, acted upon the
appearance of the active partner's sole ownership
(citing cases) . "
This same principal is set forth at C.J.S. Partnership,
Section 36A, Dormant or Secret Partners as follows:

-7-.
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"Where dormant partner permits the busii:ess world
to believe that the ostensible partner is the
owner of the business, he has been held to be
estopped from claiming to the contrary against
those who have in good faith acted on such
appearance."
By permitting the ostensible partner (Franich) to take an
interest in real property in his own name, appellant Johnson
placed Mr. and Mrs. Jenner in a position where they were entitled
to act on appearances given by the ostensible partner and deal
with him as though he were the only partner having an interest in
the "partnership property".

The "appearance" is further

compounded by the addition of Mrs. Franich and the Nielsons on
the Assignment document (R. 3).
As set forth in 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Joint Venture, Section
17, Purchase and Sale of Real Property:
"Such property may be acquired and owned jointly
by a joint venture although the title may be taken
in the name of only one of the co-venturers."
Such an arrangement results in innocent third parties having to
deal with the co-venturer and others named in the property
transaction as though they were the only parties having an
interest. ·Mr. Johnson's remedy would appear to be a partnership
accounting with Mr. Franich and, perhaps, as a result of the
transaction wherein he acquired the Quit Claim Deed, an action
for misrepresentation and recovery of the cash paid in exchange
for the deed.

Certainly there was a duty on the part of Franich,

who acted in a fiduciary capacity with his co-venturer, to
divulge that the Uniform Real Estate Contract had been declared
in default and that an unlawful detainer action was then pending
seeking possession of the property, cancellation of the contract,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and a determination that all monies paid were to be considered
liquidated damages.

POINT II
NOTICE IN THE FORM OF BOTH THE NOTICE TO QUIT
AND THE SUMMONS WERE NOTICE TO APPELLANT WHO
WAS A CO-VENTURER OF THE PARTY SERVED.

58 Am. Jur. 2d 506, Notice, Section 25, sets forth
generally the law regarding notice to "co-owners" of real
property.

It is there stated:
"Where two persons enter into a joint transaction
for joint benefit, notice of a fact to one of them
is also notice to both so far as that transaction
is concerned."

Among the cases there cited is Sweet Sixteen Company v. Sweet
"16" Shop, 15 F2d 920 (8th Cir.) in which the federal court

quotes 20 R.C.L. 355 to the effect that:

"Notice to one partner

is notice to other partners."
It follows, therefore, that appellant Johnson had
notice of the default in the payment of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract on the date that Joseph C. Franich received the Notice
to Quit, August 8, 1981.

It further follows that notice that

plaintiffs sought cancellation of the contract, restoration of
possession, and forfeiture of all payments made under the
contract as liquidated damages, was given again in the form of a
summons served on Joseph

c.

Franich September 11, 1981.

Appellant Johnson is in the position of one who
received notice of the delinquent condition of a real estate
contract and waited 53 days (period between August 8,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1981 and September 30, 1981) to take any action with respect to

remedying the default.

In the meantime, an unlawful detainer

action had been commenced by the filing of the complaint,
summonses had been served on all named defendants, the default
judgment had been entered, and the Writ of Restitution had been
issued and served.

Plaintiffs were thereafter in a position of

dealing with the property as they saw fit having no obligation to
convey to Mr. Franich and the other assignees.
Although appellant may have been duped by his business
partner and may have, as an individual, acted in good faith, ,he
has permitted Franich to deal with the property of the joint
venture in a manner affecting innocent third parties and the
burden of any loss should be borne by appellant who still has his
legal actions against his co-venturer.

POINT III
THE MOTION OF THE APPELLANT TO INTERVENE AFTER
THE ENTRY OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN AN UNLAWFUL

DETAINER ACTION UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE IS NOT TIMELY.

Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
"Intervention of right. Upon timely application
anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
re~re~entatio~ of .the applicant's interest by
ex1s~1ng p~rt1es is or may be inadequate and the
app~1cant is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated
as to b7 adv~r~ely affected by a distribution or
other d1spos1t1on of property which is in the
custody or subject to the control or disposition
of the Court or an officer thereof."
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Appellant argues that he is in the situation contemplated by
number (3) above.
Even if it were conceded that appellant is one whose
situation is contemplated by the group designated (3) in our
rules, the application of the proposed intervenor must be
"timely".
Although there are many cases wherein intervention
after the entry of a judgment has been permitted, a reading of
the cases annotated in United States Code Annotated (Title 28),
Rule 24, establish that:
"There is considerable reluctance on the part of
courts to allow intervention after action has gone
to judgment" (McClain v. Wagner Electric Corp.,
C • A • Mo . 1 9 7 7 , 5 5 0 F 2 d 1 1 1 5 ) ; "mot ions for
intervention made after entry of final judgment
will be granted only upon strong showing of
entitlement and of justification for failure to
request intervention sooner" (U.S. v. Association
Milk Producers, Inc. C.A. Mo. 1976, 534 F2d 113,
cert. denied, 97 s. Ct. 355, 429 U.S. 940, 50 L.
Ed 2d 309); "post judgment interventions are
generally disfavored because of the assumption
that they will prejudice rights of existing
parties and interfere with the orderly processes
of the court (Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, D.C. Ka. 1979, 84
F.R.D. 383); "intervention after entry of final
judgment will not be allowed unless a strong
showing is made or where unusual or compelling
circumstances are demonstrated" (Com. of
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, D.C. Pa. 1975, 66 F.R.D.
598, aff. 530 F.2d 501, cert. denied 96 S. Ct.
2628, 426 U.S. 921, 49 L. Ed. 2d 375);
"interventions after judgment have a strong
tendency to prejudice existing parties to
litigation or to interfere substantially with
further legal process of court" (U.S. v. U.S.
Steel Corporation, C.A. Ala. 1977, 548 F2d 1232).
In Rains v. Lewis, 579 P2d 980, 20 Wash. App. 117
(1978) the Court stated:

"If (intervention is) permitted after judgment, it
~ ~ ~~ -,1y on a strong showing after taking
_--_
~?:-::.7_~
--~~-.=:-=:~::.·::.~ration
all
including
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prior notice of the lawsuit and circums-c.arH..:t::;:,
contributing to the delay in making the mo~ion.
To this we would add a showing of substantial
prejudice if permission to intervene is denied."
Commenting on post-judgment intervention, the
annotation at 37 A.L.R. 2d 1306 "Time for Intervention" states:
"Subject to certain limitations, it is the general
rule that, ordinarily, intervention will not be
allowed after the final judgment or decree has
been entered. (citing cases)"
The Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Shawnee County, Kansas (supra) held that:
"Determination as to tl'me limits of an
intervention motion is a flexible one and must be
made on a case-by-case basis taking into account
all the appropriate circumstances."
In Wilson v. Harris, 302 S.W. 2d 86, 227 Ark. 808
(1957), intervenors were not named as defendants in an original
quiet title action and sought to intervene more than one month
after a decree was entered.
allow such intervention.

The Court upheld the refusal to

In Stern G. Investment Co. v. Danziger,

206 Cal. 456, 274 P. 748 (1929) it was held in a quiet title
action that the intervenor's claim being "only from or under"
that of defendants already in default, this precluded
intervention as a matter of right.
In Martin v. Lawrence, 156 Cal. 191, 103 P. 913 (1909),
the Court barred intervenor from entering the action where he
took title from a party in default after the recording of a Lis
Pendens.

Respondents in the instant case contend that the notice

given appellant by service of both the Notice to Quit and the
Summons on his co-venturer is as effective in barring
intervention as though there had been a Lis Pendens recorded~
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Both are forms of constructive notice and should be equally
effective.

POINT IV
THE MOTION OF THE APPELLANT TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS MOOT IF HE IS NOT PERMITTED
TO INTERVENE AND WAS PROPERLY DENIED.

A motion to set aside a judgment is to be considered
and decided by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion
and its decision should be overturned on appeal only if it
plainly appears that it has abused its discretion.

Haller v.

Wallace, 573 P.2d 1302 89 Wash. 2d 539 (1978), Pamilen
Industries, Inc. v. Sheen - U.S.A., Inc. 622 P.2d 1270 95 Wash.
2d 398 (1981).

Under the circumstances here the district court

judge properly exercised his discretion.

He correctly ruled that

the appellant was not entitled to intervene, and the matter of
setting aside the default judgment thereby became moot.
Even if appellant were not faced with the problem of
intervention, it has been held that in discussing the proper
exercise of discretion by a trial court in permitting the
vacating of a judgment, there are several factors which should be
considered including: (1) the moving party must show substantial
evidence to support, prima facie, a defense to the claim; (2)
failure to appear must be due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect; (3) the moving party must have acted with
due dil.igence after notice of entry of default; (4) there should
be no substantial hardship result to the opposing party if the
judgment is set aside; see White v. Holm, 438 P.2d 581, 73 Wash.
~~

~AO

110~0\
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It appears that appellant is unable to show a prima
facie defense to the claim since all parties admit that the
contract was delinquent and the forfeiture of the sums paid by
the buyers was not out of proportion to the reasonable rental
value of the property during its occupancy.

Although the record

is silent on what hardships might result to plaintiffs if the
judgment is set aside, the appellant has failed to show that no
substantial hardship would result to plaintiffs if their motion
was granted.

CONCLUSION
The appellant being a silent or dormant partner or coventurer with defendant Franich is held to have received the same
notice as did Franich.

He should not be permitted to intervene

in the unlawful detainer action following entry of judgment and
issuance of Writ of Restitution not only for the reason that his
application to intervene was not timely under the circumstances
but he is estopped by virtue of his silent partnership status to
claim an interest in the real property the subject of the
unlawful detainer action.
DATED this

day of March, 1982.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

Allen M. Swan
Attorneys for Respondents
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served appellant's counsel, Lee
Rudd, of Hunt & Rudd, two copies of the foregoing Respondents'
Brief by mailing to said attorney at 311 South State Street,
Suite 440, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 this

day of March,

1982.
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